Does the wide distribution of political power in democracies, relative to other modes of government, result in better decisions? What, if anything, can be said about the substantive properties of political decisions which have been arrived at democratically? Specifically, do we have any reason to believe that they are better qualitatively -more reasoned, better supported by the available evidence, more deserving of support -than those which have been made by other means? These are the problems which have dominated democratic political theory in recent years, generating a veritable explosion of philosophical debate about the moral significance of different ways of institutionalizing democratic debate and decision-making. This paper seeks to provide a philosophical overview and evaluation of this literature, through an evaluation of the claim that Peircean pragmatism shows democracy to have epistemic qualities that should lead us to support it even when we are most sceptical and disenchanted with the outcomes it has generated.
1 If Talisse and Misak are right, the legitimacy of democratic government is epistemic as well as moral or political: because democratic freedoms, rights and institutions -or so they claim -enable people to distinguish true from false beliefs better than the alternatives. Because we allno matter our particular beliefs -have reason to want our beliefs to be true and, qua believers, suppose that what we believe is, in fact, true -Talisse and Misak claim that we have compelling epistemic reasons to support democracy even if we are bitterly divided about the morality of abortion or capital punishment, or about the political wisdom of interventionist wars or economic policies. (Talisse, CRISPP, p….) In short, if Talisse and Misak are correct, Peircean epistemology gives us compelling reasons to affirm the legitimacy of democratic government even when we are most exasperated or repelled by our fellow citizens, and most disenchanted with democratic politics.
Our approach is motivated by considerable sympathy for Misak and Talisse's project, since it is plausible that democratic freedoms and procedures do, as claimed, facilitate the creation and promotion of important epistemic goods -such as the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, to discover new truths and to assess or reassess old ones. It is also plausible that our interests in truth provide instrumental reasons to support some types of democracy, even when they do not amount to a full-blown 'justification' of democratic government on epistemological grounds. However, democracies appear to face distinctive epistemic challenges, given the weight of popular opinion 1 Peircean pragmatism is an interpretive construct, for the purposes of this paper, based around the important and its malleability, which forms of government that are less free and less egalitarian may not face, or may be better placed to withstand. 2 We therefore doubt that the epistemologically attractive properties of democracy -whatever these are -are sufficient to support a general preference for democratic over undemocratic forms of government, and doubt the force that epistemic reasons are likely to have when, or if, we are unmoved by the moral and political qualities of democracy.
Talisse and Misak, we believe, are wrong to suppose that epistemic considerations can substitute for moral considerations when justifying coercive power over others. The advantages of democracy, as a fair system of collective decision-making amongst equals, we argue, apply to the epistemic disagreements of citizens as much as to their moral or political ones. Truth is only one of many epistemic goods which we might want our political system to promote, whatever our interests in it as individuals. For example, we might want our political system to promote useful knowledge, or forms of discovery and verification which are maximally accessible to citizens who differ in their specialised knowledge, needs and capacities. We may therefore prefer decision procedures which have the epistemic virtues of 'ease of deliberative use', or 'epistemic economy' over ones which most reliably get to the truth, but which make much greater demands on citizens, or work only when citizens have excellent sources of information. 3 Or, as Tocqueville suggested, we might prefer political systems which enable us to avoid the worst errors, even if they prevent us from reaching the summits of brilliance and wisdom. (ch. ….) In short, the problem of 'reasonable pluralism' -that intelligent, well-informed and well-meaning people can disagree fundamentally about matters of great importance -infects epistemology quite as much as morality. 4 So even were it the case that truth was the sole epistemic good for us individually, it need not follow that truth is the epistemic property we must most value in our political systems. Gerlsbeck is the one who gave this name to a particular way of thinking about this specific model of reliable decision-making. For Gerlsbeck, reliability is defined by 'the ratio of right over false decisions, and this ratio is equivalent to the average expected likelihood to decide correctly on any given decision'. Gerlsbeck, 2016, pp. 4-5. Key examples of this 'juror-model' are Christian List and Robert Goodin, 2001 (eg. p. 277) , David Estlund, (2008 , 2011 There are, however, several well-known and obvious difficulties with using the jury model of decision-making as a guide to politics. The first, and most obvious, is that because jurors have only one issue to think about, there is no question of weighing the relative importance of correctness across different decisions when evaluating competing models of decision-making (or of education, for that matter). For example, in democratic politics we may be relatively unconcerned about the chances of erroneous judgement on some issues, but supremely concerned about them on others.
Which tax rate maximises national income is not a subject of indifference, but getting it wrong may not be terribly important given that democracies have to place so many normative constraints on the goal of maximising taxable income, (such as commitments to freedom, equality, solidarity, security, transparency, consistency, or fair and efficient administration). By contrast, democracies can tolerate very much less error on matters that affect the lives and health of millions, and that can have catastrophic consequences not just for current citizens but for future generations, and for citizens of other countries: the safety of nuclear reactors would be a prime example of this, but so would control of deadly infectious zoonotic diseases, such as Ebola, 'avian flu' and the zika virus. To make matters worse, most political decisions are likely to concern probabilities rather than certainties, and therefore not to concern matters of fact at all. 8 We may therefore be concerned with the likelihood that x will happen, rather than the certainty that it will.
Decision procedures and people may be better or worse at estimating probabilities. However, it is inherent to probabilistic judgements that things may turn out in radically different ways, and that there is a range within which people who expect x to happen with different probabilities nonetheless may agree that x will happen. So, unlike the decisions of a juror, empirical facts of the matter are insufficient to tell us which probabilistic reasons were correct and which incorrect; 9 and matters will be complicated further by the fact that the correct interpretation of probabilities requires an assessment of the likelihood that our data is incorrect or misleading, so that the scope for 'error' must figure in our probabilistic predictions. Hence, people who expect x to happen with wildly different probabilities may end up agreeing that x is likely to happen on Wednesday, in part because they also hold wildly estimates of the quality of their information. In short, even if we abstract from issues of reasonable disagreement about epistemic and other goods, the 'juror model' of political decision-making is inappropriate for politics. Once one reflects on the fact that people who agree that there is a common good may nonetheless evaluate its content, as well as its importance quite differently without being unreasonable, 10 it becomes plain that an epistemic justification of democracy cannot rely on the jury model of decision-making.
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8 This is avoided in jury decisions because jurors are asked to convict only if the evidence removes all 'reasonable doubt' about the possible innocence of the defendant. The question before jurors, then, is a factual one: 'are there any grounds for reasonable doubt that X is guilty' and not the probabilistic question, 'how likely is it that the defendant did what s/he is accused of doing?' 9 Of course, empirical facts may prove insufficient to tell us which jurors got their verdict correct for the right reasons. However, that is merely a possibility on the jury model of correct decision-making, not a necessary implication of the type of question at issue, as it is with probabilistic decisions. 10 Lever, 'Must We Vote for the Common Good?' in Political Ethics, eds. Emily Crookston, David Killoren and Jan Trerise, forthcoming, Routledge, 2016 11 Nor, of course, can non-democratic models of correctness in politics, although as they need not worry about treating people as free and equal, it is sufficient that they make decisions from within a reasonable conception
We have seen that the juror model of decision-making is an inappropriate way to think about the epistemic merits (or demerits) of democracy, given the epistemic differences between political decisions and the decisions that jurors make in systems where they are required to decide matters of fact rather than law. 12 That does not mean that democracies have no important epistemic virtues, or advantages, but it does give us reason to wonder whether politics -let alone democratic politics -is the sort of business in which it makes sense to worry about epistemic justification at all.
Epistemic Democracy and the Common Good
On a common picture of democracy, voters are morally entitled to vote their preferences, because the accumulation of different individual preferences provides the best evidence that we have for which policies and which politicians, of those available, best further the interest of the public. On this view -associated with Schumpeter and William Riker, for example 13 -democracy is simply a way of aggregating answers to the question 'who should govern?', and it would be as ridiculous to ask for epistemic justification of the outcomes as it would be to ask about the epistemic justification for your tastes in strawberry ice-cream, sexual position, or employment. Preferences can be based on erroneous information, on sampling problems, and on wrongful extrapolations from idiosyncratic cases but, absent these sorts of problems of information and reasoning, preference-change is not generally a matter of reasoning but of taste.
The point about freedoms of expression, association and choice, from this perspective is that these may help us to avoid obvious mistakes in preference-formation, and reduce the costs to us of of the good. There is no reason for them to worry about accommodating all reasonable conceptions held by citizens.. 12 NB. French jurors, as compared to British and American ones, are asked to decide on sentences as well as on the guilt or innocence of defendants. Unlike the latter, they deliberate in the presence of a judge. These features of the French system, which encourage strategic calculations amongst jurors at the first stage of decision-making (guilt/innocence), as compared to the second stage (of sentencing) are morally problematic in many ways, in so far as they encourage jurors to accept a guilty verdict rather than to hang out for the verdict that they believe to be correct, in order to be able to influence sentencing decisions later. Instead, it is the field for the play of opinion and the best we can hope for is that this opinion will be reasonably coherent and sensitive to the available evidence, and that political conflict and competition will be sufficiently tamed that political change can arise by peaceful means, rather than through coup-d'états, chaos and bloodshed.
But while there is some truth to this sceptical and disabused picture of democratic politics, it appears to exaggerate the extent to which politics is correctly thought of as a matter of aggregating preferences, let alone the extent to which this has to be the case. Moreover, normatively, this picture of democracy as a form of tamed competition for power, appears to miss out on the reasons to prefer democratic ways of taming power to alternatives. Taking these two points together, as we will see, suggests that the difficulties of the juror model of epistemological democracy are perfectly consistent with an epistemological conception of democracy, whether or not it is reasonable to expect that democratic government can be justified epistemically. On Cohen's view, then, not all forms of government -nor all forms of democracy -are appropriately described and evaluated in epistemic terms: to the degree that they are, this is because politics has been designed so that judgements about the quality of people's knowledge, and about the evidential basis of decision-making have a significant role to play at all levels of politics. The paradigmatic example of an epistemological democracy, on this view, is one on which citizens share a common good and know that they do, such that the consequences of different political positions and policies for the common good provide a shared basis for evaluation of the empirical, normative and social-theoretic dimensions of politics. 17 For example, our common interests in security would provide the test of whether it is desirable to 'update' the Trident nuclear system in the United Kingdom, a matter that involves empirical judgements about the likely costs, benefits and risks of nuclear weapons compared to other forms of security; that requires normative judgements about the importance to be attached to these likely costs, benefits and risks given our legitimate interests in self-defence, our duties to protect others from unprovoked aggression, and our duties not to aggress other people, or to put their lives unjustifiably at risk. Finally, the social-theoretic aspects of politics are likely to figure in our judgements about the renewal of Trident missiles, given that political choices are not just for the immediate present, but must extrapolate from past experience and consider the ways in which the future might be different from both the past and the present.
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An implication of Cohen's epistemic conception of democracy, then, is that we can try to become communities of judgement, without confusing the legislative, administrative and executive aspects of politics to the juridical, or treating the judgements of juries as the prototype of democratic forms 16 For Cohen's specific ideas on the implications of these ideas for issues such as campaign funding, see his 'Procedure and Substance', pp. 172-180: Cohen and Rogers, 'Associations and Democracy', reprinted in Cohen, 2009, pp. 61-97; and Cohen and Sabel, 'Directly Deliberative Polyarchy', reprinted in Cohen 2009, 180-222. 17 In addition to the articles on democracy supra, see Cohen' it to make sense to refer to a 'common good', 'public interest' or 'shared ends', may not recognise that they have such shared interests or may lack the motivation to pursue them and to treat them as the appropriate basis for evaluating collectively binding decisions. 21 In such cases, we cannot expect epistemic judgements to have much place in democratic politics. Perhaps at the individual level, people will be able to make some epistemically significant judgements about their own political interests, and even about their political rights and duties; and experts may be able to make some epistemically significant judgements about public policy. However, these opportunities will be largely a matter of luck, (or the arbitrary distribution of epistemically relevant resources and opportunities), and there will be no mechanisms to ensure that individuals are equally fortunate in this respect, or that it is generally possible or desirable to bring well-founded knowledge to bear on politics.
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19 If the difficulty of juror models of truth is that they identify judicial decisions with one particular form that they might take -one that, arguably, is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic justice -the problem with democratic arguments for judicial review is that these usually depend on a rather particular model of judicial decision-making whose empirical foundations are as contested as are their normative properties. (Feb. 1991), 221-225. 21 That this is often the case is the implication of those forms of critical theory -embodied, for instance, in
Habermas' Legitimation Crises and Theories of Communicative Action -which assume that observers may be able to identify common interests not recognised by participants themselves, as well as fallacious and selfserving claims about the common good, even if these are quite widely accepted. See also Cohen and Sabel's 'directly deliberative polyarchy' , with its assumption that even in contemporary America there may be much more scope for action on shared interests than is currently recognised, although that action will require institutional change adequately to be realised; and Cohen's 'The Arc of the Moral Universe', which explains why we can judge that slavery is not in the legitimate interests of slaves even when it leaves them materially better off than they otherwise would be, republished in The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays, (Harvard U P, 2010), 15-74. 22 See, in particular, Cohen and Rogers on unequal opportunities to associate together, and the epistemic, moral and political consequences of those inequalities in their work on associative democracy.
Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy v. Epistemic Justifications of it
Rejecting the juror model of political truth or wisdom, then, does not mean that democratic politics is and must be devoid of epistemic value, or that those values must be trivial or unimportant. That, indeed, is the reason to prefer Talisse and Misak's conception of the threshold that an epistemic justification of democracy must meet to be successful, compared to the one proposed by Estlund.
While the latter supposes that democracy is epistemically justified so long as it is likely to arrive at collectively binding decisions that are just a bit better than random, 23 Talisse and Misak suppose that what we are concerned with are the epistemic advantages of the best of the alternatives. 24 This seems the correct epistemic standard both because epistemically we may be incapable of knowing what the likelihood is of getting at the truth randomly, (whether because of the epistemic disadvantages of democracy or not), and morally because the democratic justification of legitimate coercion is unlikely to look persuasive unless democracies have the epistemic capacities to realise the ends that they affirm. Thus, even if democracies are better than random -perhaps much better than random -at tracking truth, there may be undemocratic forms of government sufficiently close to them politically, (perhaps they are constitutional but not fully democratic), which would be preferable morally, given the ends that democracies themselves affirm, because they are sufficiently better at creating, distributing and using the knowledge, creativity and education of citizens to compensate for their failure to be fully democratic.
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The question, then, is whether there is any reason to suppose that democratic government is justified epistemically, even assuming that we are talking about an epistemic, rather than a non- concern ourselves with our 'cognitive environment', because only some cognitive environments favour the acquisition of true beliefs. 30 Thus if we want our beliefs to be true (and we want them to be true not as a matter of luck or good fortune) we will want to live in a cognitive environment 'in which crucial or especially powerful evidence with respect to important matters would emerge and be widely disseminated, were it to exist'. (Talisse, 2013, p. 510) Talisse assumes that we care about the epistemic quality of our beliefs because we take the things we believe to be true, or at any rate, 'when we believe, we aim to believe what is true'. (Talisse, 2013, 509) There is, thus, an implicit normative claim to our beliefs -the claim that they are true -and our ability to make good on this normative claim requires us, so Talisse thinks, not just to show that our beliefs are borne out by the evidence, but to show that we formed them in an environment conducive to truth. Such a cognitive environment, he claims, is 'best secured' by democratic political institutions, (Talisse, 2013, 502) because unlike the institutions of open but undemocratic societies, democracy enables us to monitor and change our environment. (Talisse, 2013, 516) The crux of an epistemological justification of democracy, then, according to Talisse, is our ability to make our environment conducive to the exchange and assessment of competing claims about truth -and to recognise and maintain that conduciveness, once discovered. The difficulty with the epistemically best forms of undemocratic government, on this view, are that Platonic kings are absolute monarchs, and so people may be unable to monitor, let alone to change, policies that affect their access to truth and their ability to distinguish it from falsehood. So too, Talisse thinks, with any arrangements that, however constitutional and liberal, fall short of democracy. Hence, he believes, our duties to track our cognitive environment, and our interests in doing so, give us compelling reasons to favour democratic over undemocratic governments, whatever our specific assumptions about truth, or about truth in matters of morality. As Talisse and Aikin put the point, ' We need democracy in order to pursue wisdom. This view does not make any unduly rosy claims concerning the wisdom of democratic decisons, and it isf ully consistent with a pessimistic assessment of the wisdom of individual democratic citizens. Our Claim rather is that democracy is the political manifestation of our aspiration to rationally pursue the truth it is, in other words, the essential political correlate of our individual rationality'. (Talisse and Aikin, 2014, p.63-emphasis in original) .
the question of whether these epistemic reasons would work if concerns for justice, equality, freedom and self-government fail to persuade me. My faith in the epistemological qualities of my environment may depend on what rights you have, rather than on the rights that I have myself. A commitment to moral and political equality, after all, does not require us to suppose that we are all equally good at evaluating the epistemological quality of beliefs, let alone equally good at creating epistemologically warranted beliefs. Consistent with the moral reasons to favour democratic over undemocratic governments, then, I may think that we would do at least as well, epistemologically speaking, if you had political rights and I did not; or if you have two political votes, whereas I only have one. It is unclear why such beliefs would be unreasonable or inconsistent with a concern for the procedural qualities of my government -with its accountability and representativeness, for example. Nor is it clear why such beliefs must be at odds with the idea that democratic governments are legitimate in the ways that alternatives are not. There is no particular reason to suppose that moral or political arguments for democracy must proceed via claims about its epistemic superiority to other forms of government. So why, even if I am a convinced democrat, must I value political accountability and representation for epistemic reasons? Why cannot I value them despite the problems that they pose to my pursuit of truth?
A second puzzle is why democracy is supposed to be sufficient for epistemological norms, even when necessary? While Talisse maintains that we need mechanisms of monitoring and control, he says nothing about such things as collective action problems, the legacy of past injustice or the effects of international developments in science and economics, which might severely constrain our ability to monitor and control our environments, even when our governments are democratic. What reason have we, then, to suppose that democracy is sufficient for epistemic agency and, if it is only one amongst many necessary factors, what weight ought we to accord it? Democracy must be sufficient not merely necessary, for us to fulfil our epistemic duties, if Talisse and Misak's epistemic justification of democracy is to work, otherwise democracy will be merely one of many necessary things for us to realise our epistemic duties, and the justification of democracy will turn on the relative importance of democracy compared to these other epistemically necessary factors. So unless democracy is sufficient for us to realise our epistemic duties Peircean pragmatism will not
give us a general justification of democracy, let alone one that can compensate for whatever moral and political deficiencies it might have. 31 Doubts about the epistemic necessity of democracy, of course, do not pre-empt the possibility that, in some circumstances, democracy may be sufficiently 31 Lever, "Democracy and Epistemology: A Reply to Talisse"; MacGilvray, "Democratic Doubts: Pragmatism and the Epistemic Defense of Democracy"; Bacon, "The Politics of Truth: A Critique of Peircean Deliberative Democracy."
good epistemically for us to prefer it to other forms of government. However, we would still need to know the conditions under which that possibility has been, is, or might be realised. Moreover, even if successful, the failure to show that democracy is generally necessary and sufficient for us to realise our epistemic duties suggests that Peircean pragmatism does not offer as distinctive a perspective democracy as its proponents believe, let alone that it offers a justification for democracy for those times when we are most disillusioned with it morally or politically.
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Finally, Talisse's conception of democracy seems to take some form of liberal representative democracy as its model of the democratic minimum required by epistemic norms -though it is unclear that elections, rather than lotteries, are necessary for democratic government, (Manin 1997) however important they are to democratic forms of representative government. He appears to suppose that 'direct democracy' is more demanding than representative democracy, and so cannot be required by epistemic arguments for democracy (Talisse 2013) . This is not self-evident, because representative democracy is a complex political and cultural arrangement, and it may be more demanding epistemically, as well as morally and politically, than other forms of democracy. For example, representative democracy requires us to judge the epistemic, moral and political qualities of representatives with regard to the particular issues we are most concerned with politically.
Representative democracy, therefore, may make epistemic demands on us which are different from, and perhaps more demanding than, those required by direct democracy. In any case, why should we not seek the optimal form of democracy, from an epistemic view, and why are we not required to do so by the same logic that commits us to eschewing governments where people are happy, healthy, wealthy and wise, but not self-governing? If epistemic norms are so important that we should support democracy, why do they not require us to grant legitimacy only to a specific form of democracy (for example, a platonic one), even if concerns for morality might lead us to favour another democratic arrangement, such as a more participatory or a socialist one?
In short, the difficulty for an epistemic democracy lies less in the concept of truth or of epistemic virtue that we choose, than with relating that standard to democratic rights, duties and permissions, and to the legislative, executive, judicial and administrative institutions that turn individual judgements into collective ones. As we have seen, democracies are likely to require different epistemic standards for collectively binding decisions, given their differential moral and political importance. These different standards have implications for the epistemic duties, rights and 32 The latter difficulty is not particularly surprising: after all, Talisse, Misak et al., are notably indifferent to the causes of political alienation and disenchantment with democracy in Europe, let alone America, and therefore place far more importance on conflicts over abortion, for example, than is warranted by the available evidence. For more empirically persuasive accounts of political alienation, whether in proportional or majoritarian forms of democracy, see [Further referencing needed] permissions of citizens as individuals. If it makes sense to suppose that more and better evidence is required to renew Trident missiles than to determine the most effective tax rate then citizens, by implication, need more and better evidence to justify their opinions on the former than the latter.
That does not change the fact that, on democratic principles, legislators will have far more demanding epistemic duties than ordinary citizens, given the special powers and responsibilities of their position. So an epistemic conception of democracy needs not only to reflect the epistemic duties of all citizens, faced with the different collectively binding decisions that they must take, but it will be necessary, as well, to distinguish the epistemic duties of those with special power and responsibility from those of ordinary citizens. 33 Those special powers and responsibilities, of course, need not be legislative rather than judicial, executive or administrative and, in principle, will apply to citizens in their role as parents, employers, doctors and religious leaders as much as in their roles as voters, jurors, and agents of physical and social security. These different epistemic duties, as well as the different moral and political duties which they reflect, appear also to explain why some forms of citizen reflection and decision making must be open to the scrutiny and participation of others, whereas others need not. (Lever, 2015, 162-180; and , 2014, 109 -10; ) . In short, the connection between the epistemic demands on individuals, justified by our shared interests in truth, appear to be too thin to provide a justification of the epistemic demands of democracy.
If these arguments are correct, we must distinguish the idea that different forms of democracy have different epistemic properties from the claim that we can offer an epistemic justification for (even) the epistemically best forms of democracy -whatever they are. An epistemic conception of democracy, as presented by Cohen, concerns the ability of democracies to make decisions that are reasoned, as opposed to the product of chance, passion, fashion, ignorance and error. However, as presented by Cohen, our reasons to care about the epistemic possibilities of democracy are fundamentally normative, and a reflection of the claims to legitimacy that democracies make on their own behalf, and as compared to non-democratic forms of government. They therefore give us no reason to suppose that there is an epistemic justification of democracy which could substitute for its justification on moral or political grounds, even though citizens may be able to justify their obedience to decisions they take to be morally wrong on the ground on the grounds that these are 33 Or the significance of these points for democratic objections to 'open voting' and to compulsory voting, see Lever, 2007, Utilitas, 19.3, 354-378; , Lever 2015, Law Culture and the Humanities, 11.2, 164-183; Lever, 2010, British Journal of Political Science, 40.4, 897 -915 and 925-929. 
Conclusion: Epistemic Democracy and Democratic Pragmatism.
We therefore conclude that there is no purely epistemic justification of democracy, given that democracy is a fundamentally normative notion, which constrains the forms of ignorance, as of knowledge, that can count in its justification. That does not mean that democracy is not sometimes sufficiently important epistemically that we have reason to prefer it on those grounds to alternative forms of government. However, we have seen that democracy is not epistemically necessary, however important our interests in truth, and it is unclear which forms of democracy, if any, would be justified by our epistemic interests, whatever these are. Finally, we have seen that Misak and Talisse are mistaken that the epistemic virtues of democracy, however real, would give us compelling reason to prefer democratic to undemocratic governments if we were seriously in doubt about the legitimacy of the former. Indeed, they might give us no reason to prefer democratic government to anarchy, or to at least those forms of anarchical arrangement that seem closest to democratic moral and political ideals. The wide bodies of work of Rawls, Cohen, and Dennis Thompson are all relevant to this [Further Referencing needed] . 35 These features of democratic rights regularly appear in debates on whether privacy can be democratic, and deserving of moral or legal treatment as a right. For the reasons to suppose that it can, despite its moral, political and epistemic disadvantages, from a democratic perspective, see Jean Cohen's, 'Redescribing Privacy: Identity, Difference and the Abortion Controversy', Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 3.1, pp. 48-118, who was one of the first to treat the limits privacy sets to public accountability as a strength, not merely a weakness, if we care about democracy; see also Beate Rossler….and 2015; Annabelle Lever, 2011 , 2015 and Dorota Mokrosinska, 20?3, 2015 . See also the debate on the specifically epistemic properties of privacy in ….. 36 Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, 'Knowledge, Morality and Hope: The Social Thought of Noam Chomsky', in Cohen, 2010, pp. 231-259. Peircean arguments for democracy, then, are best understood as supplements rather than replacements for other ways of justifying democracy. So understood, they have many attractive features. The first is that they take seriously individuals' interests in justifying their beliefs to others, and in ascertaining their merits themselves. Secondly, the connections they suggest between individuals' interests in truth and their interests in democratic forms of politics are often persuasive, although sometimes overstated. To that extent, Peircean arguments for democracy fit nicely with Cohen's epistemic conception of democracy, and with his defence of truth as a necessary ingredient of democratic government against Rorty's claims that democrats should abandon a concern with truth on pragmatist grounds, and Rawls' worry that respect for reasonable disagreement amongst equals, means that political liberals may have to treat 'truth' as an unacceptably divisive concept politically, and therefore to replace claims it in political discussion with claims about what is 'reasonable' or 'most reasonable'.
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Third, Peircean arguments for democracy may suggest that democracy is preferable epistemically to other forms of government even in the absence of the specific features that make for an epistemic conception of democracy on Cohen's view. A great deal turns, inevitably, on how precisely our interests in truth are to be understood in Peircean terms. Nonetheless if, as we have seen, the crux of the Peircean argument for democracy is that democracy enables citizens to alter the policies, people and institutions which they have hitherto used to govern themselves, then democracies which are open and participatory, but lack a well-developed sense of the common good, may still have epistemic virtues that undemocratic forms of government lack. Indeed, it is possible that something much closer to Dahl's pluralist polyarchy might constitute an epistemically satisfactory form of government on Peircean terms, even if it is less good epistemically and morally than other forms of democratic government. 38 In short, Peircean arguments for democracy are interesting not merely because their difficulties show that, and why, there is no purely epistemic justification of democracy, but because they appear to imply that an epistemic justification of democracy may be possible without first adopting an epistemic conception of democratic government. This, indeed, would reflect well known arguments about the epistemic advantages of liberalism and constitutional democracy which, whether in the form provided by Tocqueville or by Mill, clearly implied that 37 Cohen, "Truth and Public Reason," 247-250; Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy"; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, See Dahl [Further Referencing needed] democracy has important epistemic virtues over alternative forms of government, despite its real weaknesses from an epistemic, as well as a moral and political perspective.
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Finally, the strengths as well as the weaknesses of Peircean arguments for democracy provide an important contrast to recent Neo-Deweyan arguments for democracy, thereby highlighting the richness of pragmatist political thought and its significance for epistemic, as well as moral and political, arguments for democracy. In recent years, political theorists interested in democracy have reworked key elements of Dewey's ideas about the nature and virtues of democracy, in order to render them more detailed and concrete, and to separate them from the controversial or questionbegging ideas about goodness, growth and creative intelligence which have detracted from Dewey's own formulations of his ideas. 40 Thus, Knight and Johnson claim that there is a pragmatist case for giving democracy priority over undemocratic ways of organising our collective life not because democracy is of supreme moral or epistemic importance but, more modestly, because it is better than the alternatives at creating desirable conditions for decision-making:
'(1) facilitating experimentalism on institutional choice, (2) monitoring and maintaining institutional effectiveness ….and (3) reflexively monitoring its own effectiveness. The capacity of democracy to better satisfy these fundamental requirements of modern, socially diverse societies provides an important reason for endorsing democracy as the best means of collective governance. It grounds our pragmatist case for the priority of democracy'. [Knight and Johnson, 2011, p. 261] If the arguments of this paper are right, the differences between neo-Deweyan and Peircean arguments for democracy are of interest to democratic theorists for moral and epistemic reasons.
From the previous brief discussion, several potentially fecund tensions are already apparent. First, tended to seek to firmly distinguish epistemic and moral arguments for democracy in ways that are hard to square with an epistemically interesting conception of democracy, such as Cohen's. 42 On our view, pragmatist attempts to sharply distinguish the epistemological from the moral dimensions of democracy make it unnecessarily difficult to show that democratic government is, on balance, preferable to the alternatives. However, while Peirceans firmly hold to such a moral-epistemic distinction, Knight and Johnston specifically seem to follow Cohen in claiming 'for the pragmatist justification of democracy: the conditions of causal efficacy are the same as the conditions of normative legitimacy' (Knight and Johnson, 2011, pg 262 ).
Thus, a closer examination of neo-Deweyan and Peircean arguments for democracy, and their differences, opens the real possibility that the epistemic advantages of democracy may not be limited to democracy in its most epistemically and morally demanding forms. Cohen is right that democratic politics can and should be more than tamed competition for power over others and can, indeed, be much, much more. However, the reasons to favour democratic over undemocratic forms of government may extend beyond the specifically epistemic and deliberative forms of democracy which Cohen favours, to encompass more pluralist, agonistic and participative styles of democratic politics. 43 That, at least, is the promise of Peircean and neo-Deweyan arguments for democracy. In our view, that promise is well-worth exploring.
